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Call for papers #37

Thomas E. Chávez, Spain and the Independence of the United States: An Intrinsic Gift. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002.

As an historian who teaches courses on both Spanish history and the French Revolution, I found this book by Thomas Chávez a revelation. Indeed, I have already made changes to some of my lecture notes. And speaking with colleagues who teach courses on the American Revolution, I realized that they, too, were surprised by Chávez's evidence.
Chávez, a curator at the Museum of New Mexico, argues that Spain played a crucial and necessary part in the independence of the United States. Although U.S. historians have traditionally resisted giving credit to others for American independence, a revision has been under way for some time in which scholars have recognized the vital part played by France in the defeat of Britain. But Spain's role continues to be downplayed.
Chávez explains this neglect in two ways. John Jay, sent by the Americans to negotiate with Spain, did not speak Spanish, despised Catholics, and did not like his Spanish counterparts, including Minister of State José Moñino, the Count of Floridablanca, who drove a hard bargain and infuriated Jay, and the brilliant Spanish ambassador in Paris, Pedro Pablo Abarca de Bolea, the Count of Aranda. Jay's biases shaped American perceptions of the Spanish during and immediately after independence. Also, Spain preserved its official neutrality until the summer of 1779, more than a year after the French government entered the fray. Americans criticized Spain for this hesitancy, accusing the Spanish of being underhanded and playing a double game, willing to sell out the colonies in exchange for the return of Gibraltar. As a result, the critical role played by Spain has been ignored.
This is the situation Chávez seeks to remedy. Although Spain remained officially neutral until 1779, it was already providing significant aid to the colonies. The role of Bernardo de Gálvez, the governor of New Orleans, in this period was decisive, providing protection, money, and ammunition to the colonists from the outset of the war. In 1777, for example, Gálvez sent nine thousand pounds of precious black powder north to Wheeling, Penn., at a time when the Continental Army desperately needed it. Following the terrible winter at Valley Forge, Washington reconstituted his army in part by using Spanish supplies sent by Gálvez. The English were aware of these activities.
The fact is that the Spanish had long been making preparations for war with Great Britain. The loss of Gibraltar, Menorca, Uruguay, and Florida in the eighteenth century lit a fire under the Spanish Bourbons, who sought compensation elsewhere in Sardinia, Sicily, Naples, Parma, Piacenza, and Louisiana. Under Charles III Spain rebuilt its fleet and used it after 1777 to destroy British smuggling operations in Brazil and Central America and to retake Uruguay from Portugal, Britain's best friend on the Continent. In other words, the Spanish were far from inactive in the period before the formal declaration of hostilities in 1779.
All of this helped the colonists by diverting British resources and attention from North America. But still, it must be acknowledged that Spain waited a year longer than France to declare itself openly against the British. How does one explain this? According to Chávez, Floridablanca was simply a superior chess player. With a better grasp of reality than his French counterpart, Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, he understood that delaying Spain's entry into the war was in Spain's best interest, and this, as Chávez reminds us, was the only interest Floridablanca was obliged to serve. Specifically, Floridablanca knew it was imperative that he wait for the return of the Spanish fleet sent to Uruguay and for the arrival of the treasure fleet from Havana in the spring of 1779. Once those two things had been achieved and Spain's allies recognized the justice of her desire to regain Florida, Menorca, and Gibraltar, Spain declared war. Contrary to legend, during its period of neutrality Spain never placed American independence on the bargaining table. The British, it is true, showed themselves at times willing to talk about securing Spanish neutrality by giving up Gibraltar and Menorca, but there is no evidence that the Spanish ever really entertained such a notion.
Once committed, Spain acted with remarkable consistency. Indeed, as Chávez remarks, with perhaps unintended humor given the old stereotype of Spanish unpreparedness, "forethought [was] becoming rampant in Spanish policy. . . ." Almost everywhere Spain struck, it enjoyed victory. In North America, Gálvez in New Orleans took Biloxi, Pensacola, and lesser towns, defended Saint Louis, and sent a force as far north as Michigan to destroy a British supply depot. To the south, Spanish forces destroyed British outposts in Central America, seized Nassau, and threatened an invasion of Jamaica. In Europe, Spain retook Menorca and seized an enormous British commercial convoy off the Azores. The Spanish navy maintained a blockade of Gibraltar, forcing the British to divert major resources to relieve the colony. All of this, combined with the presence of a French army encamped at Boulogne prepared to cross the channel, forced the British to maintain much of their fleet close to home, thus sacrificing naval parity in the Americas. This is what allowed the French navy to attain tactical superiority off the Chesapeake Bay, isolating the British at Yorktown and forcing their surrender. Indeed, even at Yorktown the Spanish played a critical though entirely unrecognized role, according to Chávez. The French fleet sailed north from its Caribbean bases with the understanding that the Spanish would protect French possessions left vulnerable by such a move. Moreover, money sent by Spain and by Spanish subjects in the Americas, especially in Havana, funded the French expedition to Yorktown. As Chávez writes, "the battle of Yorktown was, in part, a Spanish strategy" and "the battle was funded by Spain with a line of credit that extended from Mexico through Cuba." (203) Taken as a whole, the Spanish strategy of attacking or threatening the British in many places worked to perfection, preventing Britain from concentrating its efforts on the North American colonies and securing American independence.
The book has some flaws. There is a great deal of repetition; archival work clearly delighted the author, and he seems unable to bear the thought of leaving material on the cutting room floor. And there are a few maddening factual errors, as when he writes that France entered into alliance with the colonies in February 1777. (79) This mistake (the actual date was a year later) will be confusing to readers, who may not be able to make sense of the fact that in the fall of 1777 Lafayette was still trying to persuade Vergennes to commit France to war, and that the French decision to intervene is usually associated with the important American victory at Saratoga, which came in October 1777. Nevertheless, this book persuades me of a very important historical revision: without Spanish aid, American independence could not have occurred when and as it did.
A closing word to graduate students and researchers looking for a new project. Chávez writes that on the subject of American independence the "documentary material is so plentiful in Spain that there is enough work to last many historians a lifetime." (ix) That is good news.

John Lawrence Tone
The Georgia Institute of Technology