

## **Playing the game: When group success is more important than downgrading deviants**

THOMAS A. MORTON\*, TOM POSTMES  
AND JOLANDA JETTEN  
*University of Exeter, UK*

### *Abstract*

*Partisan respondents evaluated a potential party leader (Study 1) or an ingroup political candidate (Study 2) who expressed normative or deviant opinions against a backdrop of public opinion that was either supportive of, or hostile toward, the ingroup's traditional beliefs (Study 1) or the normative ingroup position on a specific issue (Study 2). Across both studies, high identifiers gave stronger support to a normative candidate over a deviant candidate when public opinion was with the group, but not when public opinion was against the group. Under the latter conditions, high identifiers instead upgraded the deviant candidate. Additional analyses revealed this pattern of differential support for normative and deviant candidates among high identifiers appeared to be related to strategic considerations—specifically, the candidate's perceived chances of gaining public support and being elected. Among low identifiers, support for normative and deviant candidates was less affected by the broader context of public opinion, and was not related to such strategic considerations. These results demonstrate that responses to deviance depend on the broader context in which deviance occurs. Deviance can, at times, be a way through which groups achieve important goals. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

In 2004 British local council election, the British National Party (BNP) fielded a surprise candidate. Although traditionally associated with the extreme nationalist right of politics, the party selected Pat Richardson, a 58-year-old Jewish woman, as their candidate for Epping Forest local council. This was a controversial move (e.g. Golan, 2004). For many BNP supporters, Richardson's candidacy was a violation of the core ideology of their party. But, others in the party viewed Pat as a strategic choice. By subverting the BNP public image, Richardson might attract voters otherwise hostile to the party, and contribute to electoral success. This example raises an interesting question: what leads one group member to reject what they view as an unacceptable violation of the group's norms and another to

\*Correspondence to: Thomas A. Morton, School of Psychology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QG, UK.  
E-mail: T.Morton@exeter.ac.uk

Contract/grant sponsor: ESRC Research Fellowship; contract/grant number: RES 000-27-0050.

embrace what they view as a reasonable strategy? Although research has explored responses to deviance within groups, it has focused on contexts in which deviance carries few material implications for the group. To date, conditions under which deviance might carry the promise of group gains, and how this affects evaluations of deviant individuals by other group members, have not been considered. The aim of the present research was to partially fill this gap.

## DEVIANCE WITHIN GROUPS

Research on the 'black sheep effect' (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) suggests that individuals who depart from their group's accepted values and practices are likely to be rejected as deviants, rather than to be praised for their creativity or innovativeness. In fact, the treatment of deviant ingroup members can be more severe than the treatment of outgroup members who engage in identical behaviour. Although this pattern was first observed in relation to behaviours that were objectively 'good' or 'bad', subsequent research suggests that the objective value of deviance may be less important than its *subjective* value. What appears to matter most is how deviant behaviour fits with group norms (i.e. the subjective group dynamics model; see Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Hutchison, & Viki, 2005 for an overview). Along these lines, responses to deviant group members are most negative when their behaviour violates salient ingroup norms rather than general codes of behaviour (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Toboada, 1998); when norm-violations blur the intergroup distinction (i.e. anti-norm deviance; Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000); and when judgments are made in intergroup rather than intragroup contexts (Matheson, Cole, & Majaka, 2002).

These patterns point to an interpretation of the black sheep effect as being motivated by concerns for positive social identity. By derogating deviant individuals and rejecting them from the group (psychologically or in actuality), group members maintain a positive and coherent image of the group as a whole (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002; Hutchinson & Abrams, 2003), and preserve the integrity of valued group norms (Abrams et al., 2000; Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998). This is underlined by the fact that responses to deviants are most extreme when made by those who identify strongly with the group (Castano et al., 2002; Marques et al., 1998a), particularly when the value of the group is under threat (Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001).

## GROUP GOALS AND THE EVALUATION OF DEVIANCE

Research on the black sheep effect and subjective group dynamics serves as a reminder that although people might typically display allegiance to fellow ingroup members, allegiance to the ingroup is not blind. Instead, whether or not people support others within their group depends on how their behaviour fits with the group's norms. Yet, at the same time as these perspectives question the inevitability of ingroup favouritism, they seem to replace allegiance to the group with allegiance to group norms. That is, preserving the integrity of group norms becomes the primary motivation underlying responses to others within the group. Indeed, in many contexts motives for norm preservation may be paramount. However, in other contexts questioning the norms of the group might be desirable (Hornsey, 2006), or in other ways 'make sense' and thus attract a very different response (see also Hornsey, Jetten, McAuliffe, & Hogg, 2006).

In particular, there are reasons to suspect that responses to deviance might become complex when such behaviour is overlaid with other group goals. For instance, when a political party's views are

unpopular with the voting public, reaffirming those views (e.g. by promoting more prototypical group members) is one means to deal with such a threat. However, it may be a losing strategy politically. Emphasising the group's norms under such conditions increases the distance between the political ingroup and the voting public, and potentially undermines goals of electoral success (although standing firm in the face of opposition might eventually pay dividends; Moscovici, 1980). Under these conditions, anti-normative deviance might take on a different meaning—that is, it might be seen as a strategic move (see McGraw, Lodge, & Jones, 2002).

In addition to the role of context, deviance is likely to take on different meanings for individual group members who differ in their levels of identification with the group (Branscombe et al., 1993; Castano et al., 2002; Marques et al., 1998a). However, on the basis of past literature, it remains unclear how identification might guide responses to deviance that is potentially strategic. Ordinarily, highly identified group members should be motivated to preserve the integrity of group norms (e.g. through rejecting individuals who fail to comply with these). But, highly identified group members should also be concerned with achieving group-based success (e.g. Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003). This is because the fortunes of their group are intimately tied to their own self-evaluations (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Accordingly, when the group's norms are working against the group's chances of success, highly identified group members might not reject deviance. Instead, under these conditions high identifiers might tolerate deviance away from the groups' norms—at least to the extent that they believe such a strategy might pay off.

Consistent with this possibility, research has demonstrated that the relationships among identity, norms and behaviour can be played out quite differently depending on the consequences of norm expression (i.e. the SIDE model: Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b; Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998; Spears, Lea, Corneliusen, Postmes, & Ter Haar, 2002). Specifically, group normative behaviour is downplayed when it is likely to attract punishment or other costs (Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b). This does not undermine the importance of norms within the group. Instead, it suggests that strategic considerations might allow some flexibility in how group norms are enacted outside the group.

## THE CURRENT RESEARCH

Past research has given primary emphasis to desires for norm preservation in guiding responses to norm-violating deviants. However, it also seems possible that additional motivations might come into play, dependent on the context—and the contextual meaning—of deviance. In particular, motives to achieve group based-success might operate along-side traditional motives for norm preservation in guiding responses to deviance within groups. Such motives may routinely coincide. This is particularly likely in situations in which deviance is simply a 'matter of opinion'—that is, situations in which the meaning of deviance, or the possible reasons behind it, is ambiguous. However, in some situations motives for norm preservation and group success might also diverge—specifically, situations in which deviance might have material consequences for the group and affect valued outcomes.

This paper presents two studies designed to investigate this possibility in a political context. In both studies, partisan respondents were presented with an ingroup political candidate who expressed views that were either consistent with their party's current norms and values (i.e. normative), or advocated movement away from these (i.e. deviant). Importantly, views were expressed against a backdrop of public opinion that was either supportive of, or hostile toward, the normative ingroup position. Under each of these conditions, deviance away from the group has the potential to mean different things: in the

former, the meaning of deviance is ambiguous, but in the latter deviant behaviour has the potential to pay off and lead to success. In these cases, deviance away from the group, but toward the preferences of the public, is meaningful in a strategic sense.

Based on the black sheep effect, highly identified partisans should be guided primarily by norm preservation. As such, they would be expected to evaluate deviant ingroup candidates negatively, especially when the party was under threat from a contrary public. However, if high identifiers are also motivated by more pragmatic concerns, the strategic value of deviance should also play a role (i.e., in keeping with the SIDE model). As such, responses to deviance could be expected to be moderated by the context of opinion expression in a different way. That is, highly identified group members might tolerate deviance away from the group norm, precisely when that norm is under threat by a contrary public, to improve the group's chances of attaining success. Low identifiers, who are both less concerned with preserving group norms and less concerned with achieving group-based success, should be less inclined to distinguish between normative and deviant group members irrespective of the context. Study 1 tested these predictions among supporters of the British Conservative Party at a time in which the party was choosing a new leader. The second study sought to replicate the effects of Study 1 in a sample that comprised a cross-section of the political spectrum.

## STUDY 1

### Participants and Design

In this experiment conservative party supporters evaluated David Cameron, at that time the front-running candidate in a leadership vote within the Conservative Party and ultimately the winner of that contest. This study was conducted across the 3 weeks prior to the membership vote and the election of a new party leader. Participants were presented with a profile of Cameron in which he expressed a firm desire to uphold and maintain the party's traditional beliefs and values, or to abandon these in favour of radical changes to the group's image and underlining doctrine. Thus we manipulated the normative or deviant status of Cameron respectively.<sup>1</sup> These statements were made against a backdrop of public opinion that was presented as either moving toward or moving away from the group's traditional beliefs. Thus we manipulated the broader context of public opinion. The third independent variable, identification with the Conservative Party, was measured.

Participants were 95 students at 2 large British universities who were all conservative party supporters on a 2-party preferred basis. This sample comprised 66 women and 26 men (3 participants did not indicate gender) who ranged in age from 18–37 years (mean age = 19.64,  $SD = 2.62$ ). No reward was offered for participation.

### Measures and Procedure

Potential participants were approached at various locations on campus and were asked which of the Labour and Conservative parties they were most likely to support at the present time. Participants who

<sup>1</sup>Although it may seem improbable to manipulate the normative or deviant character of a known political candidate, Cameron was sufficiently ambiguous to project both of these positions on to. On the one-hand, Cameron's personal pedigree was classically Conservative. On the other hand, he was young and an 'unknown quantity'. Similarly, in his speeches up to that point, he appeared to signal both notions of stability and change to his audience. Apart from that apparent contradiction, both normative and deviant positions were an authentic representation of his position at that time.

indicated that they were primarily supporters of the Conservative party were included in the present study, ostensibly a survey concerned with political information processing. Labour party supporters participated in an alternative study not reported here. All responses to questionnaire items were measured using seven-point response scales (e.g. ranging from 1 = Not at all, to 7 = A great deal).

First, participants indicated the extent to which they described themselves as a supporter of the Conservative Party, identified with what the Conservative Party stands for, felt solidarity with the Conservative Party and felt similar to other Conservative Party supporters. These four items were combined and averaged to form a single index of *identification with the Conservative Party* ( $\alpha = 0.92$ ) with higher scores indicating stronger identification.

Next, participants were presented with one of two reports said to have been compiled by the (fictitious) Centre for Electoral Analysis and Voter Behaviour charting the current and future performance of the Conservative Party. In one condition, participants were told that based on the party's past electoral performance, and a shift in the electorate away from traditional conservative values, the party was almost certainly expected to fail at the next election (i.e. that public opinion was hostile to the party). In the other condition, participants were instead told that based on the party's past performance and a general shift away from traditional Labour Party values, the party had a good chance to win at the next election (i.e. that public opinion was supportive of the party). In each of the conditions, the statements in text were reinforced by graphs depicting the party's current performance and predicted future performance. To check this manipulation of opinion context, on five items participants indicated the extent to which they believed that public support for the party was decreasing or increasing relative to the past, and whether this trend was likely to continue into the future. These items were combined and averaged to form a single manipulation check of public opinion ( $\alpha = 0.87$ ).

Following the manipulation of opinion context, participants read about and evaluated David Cameron, who was the front-running candidate in the leadership vote being conducted within the party at that time. The profile consisted of a photo of Cameron and a brief biography of his political career. This information was held constant across conditions. The profile ended with statements attributed to Cameron about his intentions should he become leader of the party. These statements were varied to manipulate the degree to which Cameron's agenda for the party was normative or deviant. In the normative condition, Cameron stated that he was committed to preserving the party's traditional values and that as leader he would work hard to communicate conservative beliefs to the electorate. In the deviant condition, Cameron's closing statement instead emphasised his belief that the party needed to change and that as leader he would instigate major changes to the party's beliefs, image and membership. To check the manipulation of Cameron's status as normative or deviant, participants then indicated on two items the extent to which they perceived Cameron to be typical of the Conservative Party and representative of the views of the majority within that party. These items were averaged to form a single index of perceived typicality ( $\alpha = 0.69$ ).

After completing the manipulation checks, participants indicated the extent to which they personally: (a) supported Cameron becoming leader of the Conservative party; (b) would be happy with such an outcome; (c) would continue to vote for the party with Cameron as leader; and (d) believed that Cameron was the right person for the position. These four items were combined and averaged to form a single index of *candidate support* ( $\alpha = 0.93$ ).

Finally, participants reflected on the support Cameron was likely to receive from others within the Conservative Party (two items), and from the voting public if he was leader (two items). Each of the sets of questions were combined and averaged to form indices of Cameron's *perceived party support* ( $\alpha = 0.89$ ) and *perceived public support* ( $\alpha = 0.94$ ).

## Results

### *Median Split and Manipulation Checks*

First, participants were divided into low and high identifier groups on the basis of a median split. The resulting high and low identifier groups differed significantly from each other,  $t_{(96)} = 12.95, p < 0.001$ . Moreover, high identifiers ( $M = 5.23$ ) scored significantly above the mid-point of the scale,  $t_{(51)} = 10.51, p < 0.001$ , whereas low identifiers ( $M = 3.14$ ) scored significantly below the scale mid-point,  $t_{(45)} = 7.87, p < 0.001$ .

To check the manipulation of opinion context a 2 (identification: low, high)  $\times$  2 (opinion context: support declining, support increasing)  $\times$  2 (candidate position: normative, deviant) analysis of variance was conducted on the composite measure of perceived party performance. This revealed a significant main effect for identification,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 5.95, p = 0.02, \eta^2 = 0.06$ . High identifiers ( $M = 4.39$ ) were predictably more confident about their group's future than low identifiers were ( $M = 3.98$ ). More important there was also an independent, and larger, effect of the manipulation of opinion context,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 50.04, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.37$ . Participants in the hostile condition perceived public support for their party to lower ( $M = 3.58$ ) than participants in the supportive condition ( $M = 4.78$ ). There were no other main or interactive effects.

To check the manipulation of deviance, this analysis was repeated on the composite measure of David Cameron's perceived typicality for his party. This revealed a significant main effect for the manipulation of the candidate's position,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 18.24, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.17$ . Participants exposed to comments by Cameron that advocated deviance away from the party's core beliefs perceived this candidate to be less typical of their party ( $M = 4.11$ ) than participants exposed to statements by Cameron that emphasised maintaining traditional norms and values ( $M = 5.05$ ). Put differently, only the latter was perceived to be typical of the conservative party (i.e. scoring significantly above the scale mid-point,  $t_{(46)} = 6.77, p < 0.001$ ), whereas the former, while not perceived to be atypical, was not perceived to be typical for the party (i.e. scoring at the scale mid-point,  $t_{(47)} = 0.65, p = 0.51$ ).

### *Patterns of Candidate Support*

First, a 2 (identification: low, high)  $\times$  2 (opinion context: support declining, support increasing)  $\times$  2 (candidate position: normative, deviant) analysis of variance was conducted on *candidate support*. This revealed a significant main effect for identification,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 15.80, p < 0.001, \eta^2 = 0.15$ . High identifiers ( $M = 5.38$ ) gave stronger support to the candidate than low identifiers ( $M = 4.38$ ). However, this was qualified by a significant three-way interaction among the factors,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 7.41, p = 0.008, \eta^2 = 0.08$ .<sup>2</sup> This interaction is depicted graphically in Figure 1.

Follow-up analyses revealed that the three-way interaction was due to a Public Opinion  $\times$  Candidate Position interaction that was significant for high identifiers,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 7.10, p = 0.009$ , but not significant for low identifiers,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 1.50, p = 0.22$ . Within the high identifier group, the normative candidate attracted stronger support than the deviant candidate when public opinion was with the group,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 3.94, p = 0.05$ . When public opinion was against the group, the deviant candidate attracted

<sup>2</sup>This pattern was also apparent when the continuous measure of identification was retained. A hierarchical regression analysis in which main effects were entered at Step 1, two-way interactions at Step 2, and the three-way interaction at Step 3, accounted for significant variance in candidate support,  $R^2 = 0.29, F_{(7, 89)} = 5.04, p < 0.001$ . More important, this was due to a significant main effect of identification,  $\beta = 0.51, t = 5.33, p < 0.001$ , and a marginally significant three-way interaction at Step 3,  $R^2_{\text{ch}} = 0.03, F_{\text{ch}(1, 89)} = 3.11, p = 0.08$ .




Figure 1. Study 1: The interaction among identification, public opinion context and candidate position on candidate support

stronger support that the normative candidate,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 3.25$ ,  $p = 0.075$ , although this simple-effect was marginal.

Finally, the analysis was repeated on Cameron's perceived popularity within his party and his perceived popularity among the voting public. *Perceived party support* varied only as a function of the comments attributed to Cameron,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 17.10$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.16$ . When Cameron expressed intentions to maintain the group's norms, he was perceived to have more internal support than when he advocated deviance away from those norms (means = 5.35 and 4.46 respectively). *Perceived public support*, however, varied according to identification,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 7.03$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.08$ , as well as the interplay among identification, opinion context and the candidate's position (i.e. a significant three-way interaction),  $F_{(1, 87)} = 8.18$ ,  $p = 0.005$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.09$ . Means and standard deviations for this interaction are presented in Figure 2.

Follow-up analyses revealed that this three-way interaction was due to a Public Opinion  $\times$  Candidate Position interaction that was significant for high identifiers,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 8.65$ ,  $p = 0.004$ , but not significant for low identifiers,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 1.44$ ,  $p = 0.23$ . High identifiers perceived somewhat greater public support for the normative candidate relative to the deviant when public opinion supported the party,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 3.34$ ,  $p = 0.07$ . When public opinion was hostile to the party, high identifiers perceived greater public support for the deviant over the normative candidate,  $F_{(1, 87)} = 5.03$ ,  $p = 0.03$ .

### Mediation Analysis

Given the parallel interactions among identification, opinion context and candidate opinions on personal support for the candidate and the candidate's perceived public support, it was possible to test for mediation.




Figure 2. Study 1: The interaction among identification, public opinion context and candidate position on perceived public support

Given our theoretical interest in whether or not highly identified group members might tolerate deviance when such behaviour carries the promise of collective gain, we tested whether support for the candidate was mediated through the candidate's perceived chances of attracting public support.

Accordingly, the above  $2 \times 2 \times 2$  analyses of variance on candidate support was repeated with perceived public support for the candidate entered as a covariate. Perceived public support for the candidate was a significant covariate of respondents' own support for the candidate,  $F_{(1, 86)} = 33.51$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.28$ . More important, with the covariate entered, the three-way interaction was no longer significant,  $F_{(1, 86)} = 1.83$ ,  $p = 0.18$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.02$ .

These patterns suggest that high identifiers might have given their support to a normative candidate when their party had public support, and to a deviant candidate when the public were hostile to their party, precisely because these were the conditions under which such candidates were likely to be most successful (i.e. attract the largest vote). Consistent with this interpretation, a Sobel test for mediation was significant,  $z = -2.23$ ,  $p = 0.02$ . More important, when mediation analyses were conducted separately within each of the high and low identifier groups, there was evidence for significant mediation in the former,  $z = -2.24$ ,  $p = 0.03$ , but not the latter,  $z = 0.94$ ,  $p = 0.35$ . Again, this is consistent with the argument that high identifiers might be particularly prone to give, or withdraw, support to normative and deviant candidates on the basis of strategic concerns.

## Discussion

Study 1 demonstrates that highly identified group members do not always react against deviance within their group, even when their group is under threat. Instead, highly identified Conservative Party

supporters endorsed a normative leader (who stressed the importance of maintaining traditions), more strongly than a deviant leader (who emphasised radical change away from traditions), only when the party's traditional beliefs were likely to be popular with the voting public. When the party's beliefs were perceived to be out of favour with the voting public (i.e. under threat), the pattern was reversed. Under these conditions, highly identified Conservative Party supporters endorsed the deviant leader more strongly than the normative leader. In this sense, high identifiers appeared to be matching their future leader to the preferences of the voting public. Consistent with our interpretation of this as a strategic process, support given to the leader was mediated through a judgment about their likely success at attracting the public's support. Indeed, perceived popularity with the public seemed to matter much more than perceived popularity within the party itself. On this measure, the deviant was always evaluated more negatively than the normative candidate.

These results support our contention that responses to deviance within groups might depend on the contextual *meaning* of deviance as much as it does on its degree and direction (c.f. Abrams et al., 2000, 2005). Nonetheless, confidence in the robustness of this pattern would be strengthened if it were replicated in response to deviants who transgressed specific criterial ingroup norms, rather than advocating change within the group more generally (see Marques et al., 1998a). Although it was clear in Study 1 that the deviant was perceived to be less typical than the normative candidate, it is not clear that they were deviant in the strictest sense of the term. Indeed, the deviant in Study 1 may have further benefited from their status as a leader, and the idiosyncrasy this permits (Hollander, 1958). This may have contributed to more positive reactions to our deviant than would have been extended to a true norm-violator.

To rule out these possibilities, a second study was conducted to determine whether the pattern observed in Study 1 could be replicated when deviance involved the violation of specific and criterial ingroup norms by a rank-and-file group member (rather than a potential leader). In addition to this conceptual variation, Study 2 also included participants drawn from a different political context and from both sides of the political spectrum (i.e. to rule out the possibility that the above pattern was particular to the Conservative Party at that specific point in their history). As such, Study 2 represents a more stringent test of our hypotheses.

Again, we expected that participants' support for normative and deviant candidates would reflect the broader context of public opinion, and be given on the basis of a strategic judgment (i.e. perceptions of likely success). As such, candidates whose opinions matched public opinion were expected to be evaluated more positively than candidates who were discordant with public opinion, even when this matching involved deviance away from group norms. Again, we expected this pattern of strategic evaluations to hold only for highly identified group members. Among less identified partisans, responses to normative and deviant candidates were expected to be less affected by the context of deviance, and to be unrelated to strategic judgments. In addition to assessing the role of participants' strategic judgments in giving support to particular candidates, we examined perceptions of the candidate's own motivations—that is, if the candidate *themselves* was perceived to be motivated by strategy—and whether these also guided responses to them (see McGraw et al., 2002).

## STUDY 2

### Method

#### *Participants and Design*

This study followed the same design as Study 1. Again, participants evaluated an ingroup political candidate who expressed opinions that were either normative or deviant for that group, in the context of

public opinion that was either supportive or hostile toward the normative party line. Again, measured level of party identification was added as a third independent variable. However, in Study 2, the candidate's opinions were designed to be normative or deviant around a specific, and criterial, norm for the political ingroup. Likewise, the manipulation of opinion context was based on public support for, or opposition to, a particular stance on that issue. Again, responses to questionnaire items were measured using seven-point response scales (e.g. ranging from 1 = Not at all, to 7 = A great deal).

Initially, 127 sets of questionnaires were distributed to members of the public by students in an advanced level social psychology course at a large Australian university. On the basis of the information provided in the background questionnaire, 48 of these were excluded for being politically neutral (i.e. because they did not identify with either of the two major Australian political parties) or not clearly identified with one of the major parties (e.g. primarily supporting some other party). This left a sample of 79 respondents on which analyses were conducted.

This sample comprised 43 men and 36 women, a mix of students (41.80%), full-time workers (31.6%) and part-time workers (20.2%). Participants were 17–77 years old (mean age = 29;  $SD = 15.08$ ) and were divided between the two major political parties—39% supported the Liberal-National Coalition (LNC, the governing party at the time and representing the centre-right) and the remaining 61% supported the Australian Labor Party (ALP, representing the centre-left). No reward or incentive was offered for participation.

### *Measures and Procedure*

To determine partisanship, participants first completed a short questionnaire in which they reported their level of identification with each of the Australian Labor Party, the Liberal-National Coalition; or some other political party (specified by the participant). On the basis of this, participants were categorised according to their preferred party (i.e. the party they identified with most strongly).

One week later, participants completed a second questionnaire ostensibly concerned with political information processing in which participants read and answered questions about two newspaper articles. Although both articles were attributed to a major Australian newspaper, they were fabricated for the purposes of the study. The first article primed participants about the normative position of each party on the issue of government funding to public institutions (e.g. health and education). The article stated that the LNC stood for reduced government funding to public institutions, whereas the ALP stood for increased government funding, and that this difference was defining of the two parties.

To manipulate public opinion context, the article reported the results of an opinion poll. In one condition, participants read that 70% of voters supported the LNC call for reduced government spending on health and education. In the alternative condition, participants read that 70% of the public supported the ALP call for increased government spending in these areas. The statistics were accompanied by series of reinforcing *vox populi* statements. Participants then indicated the extent to which they believed that each of the LNC, the ALP and the Australian public opposed or supported increased government funding to health and education. These three items served to check participants' perceptions of the normative position for each political party, and the manipulation of public opinion.

Participants then read a second article that described a political candidate belonging to the respondent's ingroup (determined on the basis of Time 1 responses). The candidate began by emphasising their commitment to their party and its values. They then expressed views that either upheld the party line on the issue of government funding to health and education (the normative candidate), or they questioned the party line and expressed opinions more consistent with the political opposition (the deviant). To check this manipulation, participants indicated the candidate's political party and then identified the candidate's position on the issue of increased government funding to health

and education. As a further check, participants rated how typical the candidate was for their political party.

Participants then indicated the extent to which they would vote for this candidate were an election called tomorrow, how satisfied they would feel if the candidate were elected, and the extent to which they felt confident that this candidate could represent their views. These three items formed a reliable scale and were combined and averaged to form a composite measure of *candidate support* ( $\alpha = 0.90$ ).

Finally, participants were asked to reflect on the views expressed by the candidate and to indicate the extent to which they believed that the candidate's statements were motivated to: (a) express his own personal opinion (single item); (b) work for and support their political party by expressing the party's views (three items,  $\alpha = 0.88$ ); or (c) attract public support and win votes (three items,  $\alpha = 0.82$ ). On a single item, participants indicated how likely they thought it was that the candidate would be successful if an election were called immediately (i.e. their *chances of winning*).

## Results

### *Manipulation Checks*

Consistent with the broader normative background, participants perceived the two parties to differ significantly on the issue of government funding to public institutions,  $t_{(77)} = 8.88$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . The Australian Labor Party (ALP) was seen to support increased government funding ( $M = 5.60$  on a seven-point scale) whereas the Liberal-National Coalition (LNC) were perceived to oppose such a position ( $M = 2.22$ ). Consistent with the manipulation of public opinion, a 2 (respondent's partisanship: LNC, ALP)  $\times$  2 (opinion context: pro-LNC, pro-ALP) analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for opinion context,  $F_{(1, 73)} = 21.27$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.22$ , on public support for increased government funding. Respondents in the pro-ALP condition perceived that the public generally supported increased funding ( $M = 5.27$  on a seven-point scale), whereas respondents in the pro-LNC condition perceived the public to be less supportive of such a position ( $M = 3.55$ ). There were no additional main or interactive effects.

All participants correctly identified the candidate's party. To check the manipulation of candidate's opinions, a 2 (respondent's partisanship: ALP versus LNC)  $\times$  2 (candidate's opinions: normative versus deviant for their political party)  $\times$  2 (opinion context: pro-LNC versus pro-ALP) analysis of variance was conducted on the measure of candidate's support for increased funding to health and education. This revealed significant main effects of the respondent's party affiliation,  $F_{\text{health}}_{(1, 70)} = 8.55$ ,  $p = 0.005$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.11$ ;  $F_{\text{education}}_{(1, 70)} = 6.14$ ,  $p = 0.02$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.08$ . Consistent with the norms for each party, ALP participants perceived their candidate to support increased government funding ( $M_{\text{health}} = 5.01$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 4.67$ ) more so than LNC respondents ( $M_{\text{health}} = 3.94$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 3.65$ ).

Importantly, these main effects were qualified by interactions with the candidate's expressed opinions,  $F_{\text{health}}_{(1, 70)} = 56.21$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.44$ ;  $F_{\text{education}}_{(1, 70)} = 22.78$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.24$ . The normative ALP candidate was perceived to support increased government funding ( $M_{\text{health}} = 6.30$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 5.78$ ) more strongly than the deviant from that party ( $M_{\text{health}} = 3.72$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 3.56$ ),  $F_{\text{health}}_{(1, 70)} = 25.46$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.26$ ;  $F_{\text{education}}_{(1, 70)} = 18.83$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.09$ . The normative LNC candidate was seen to oppose increased government funding ( $M_{\text{health}} = 2.50$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 2.79$ ) more strongly than the deviant from that party ( $M_{\text{health}} = 5.38$ ;  $M_{\text{education}} = 4.51$ ),  $F_{\text{health}}_{(1, 70)} = 32.58$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.32$ ;  $F_{\text{education}}_{(1, 70)} = 7.05$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.09$ . Analysis of the typicality ratings revealed a significant main effect for candidate opinions alone,  $F_{(1, 70)} = 22.61$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.24$ . The normative candidate was perceived to be more typical

of their party ( $M = 5.58$ ) than the deviant ( $M = 3.87$ ). These patterns suggest that the manipulation of opinion deviance on the specific issue of government funding was successful.

### *Patterns of Candidate Support*

Prior to the primary analysis, opinion context (pro-ALP vs. pro-LNC) was re-coded to represent the extent to which the public was hostile towards or supportive of the ingroup party line. Next, a single measure of identification with the preferred political party (irrespective of whether this was the ALP or LNC) was created and then high and low identifier groups were created on the basis of a median split. The resulting high and low identifier groups differed significantly from each other,  $t_{(78)} = -11.09$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . High identifiers ( $M = 6.43$ ) scored near the scale end-point, and as such significantly above the scale mean,  $t_{(34)} = 28.78$ ,  $p < 0.001$ . In this study, low identifiers ( $M = 4.42$ ) also scored slightly above the scale mid-point,  $t_{(44)} = 2.10$ ,  $p = 0.04$ . This suggests that low identifiers in this study were, more accurately, moderate identifiers with their preferred party. For this reason, identification groups in this study are referred to in relative terms—that is, lower versus higher identifiers.

A 2 (candidate opinions: normative, deviant)  $\times$  2 (opinion context: hostile, supportive)  $\times$  2 (level of identification: lower, higher) analysis of variance conducted on the measure of candidate support revealed a significant main effect for candidate opinions,  $F_{(1, 70)} = 8.66$ ,  $p = 0.004$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.11$ . Respondents expressed stronger intentions to vote for a candidate whose opinions were normative for the ingroup ( $M = 4.48$ ) compared to a candidate whose opinions deviated from the ingroup norm ( $M = 3.51$ ). However, this main effect was qualified by a significant three-way interaction among the factors,  $F_{(1, 70)} = 6.73$ ,  $p = 0.01$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.09$  (Figure 3).<sup>3</sup>

Follow-up analyses revealed that this three way interaction was due to a Candidate Opinion  $\times$  Opinion Context interaction that was significant for higher identifiers,  $F_{(1, 70)} = 4.29$ ,  $p = 0.04$ , but not significant for lower identifiers,  $F_{(1, 70)} = 2.47$ ,  $p = 0.12$ . When public opinion supported the ingroup norm, higher identifiers expressed stronger intentions to vote for the normative candidate ( $M = 5.19$ ) than for the deviant ( $M = 2.93$ ),  $F_{(1, 70)} = 7.72$ ,  $p = 0.007$ , whereas when public opinion was hostile toward the ingroup normative position, higher identifiers no longer distinguished between normative and deviant candidates ( $M$  normative = 4.29,  $M$  deviant = 4.11),  $F_{(1, 70)} = 0.09$ ,  $p = 0.77$ .

This pattern of results suggests that higher identifiers in particular may have given support to candidates when it was strategic to do so—that is, endorsing a normative candidate when the public was likely to vote for such a candidate, but not when the public was likely to reject this candidate. To explore the possible role of strategic judgments in this process, we examined the candidate's perceived motivations for opinion expression (i.e. the strategies the target was perceived to be pursuing) and their perceived chances of winning voter support (i.e. the respondent's judgment of the candidate's strategic value).

Deviants ( $M = 4.16$ ) were perceived to be less motivated to support their party than were normative candidates ( $M = 5.74$ ),  $F_{(1, 68)} = 29.12$ ,  $p < 0.001$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.30$ , and marginally more motivated to express their own opinion ( $M$  normative = 4.22,  $M$  deviant = 4.90),  $F_{(1, 68)} = 3.27$ ,  $p = 0.08$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.05$ . Both

<sup>3</sup>This pattern was also apparent when the continuous measure of identification was retained. Given the skew on this variable,  $z = 3.26$ , identification was transformed prior to regression analysis by taking the inverse (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Higher scores on the transformed variable indicated lower identification. A hierarchical regression analysis in which main effects were entered at Step 1, two-way interactions at Step 2, and the three-way interaction at Step 3, accounted for significant variance in candidate support,  $R^2 = 0.21$ ,  $F_{(7, 70)} = 2.52$ ,  $p = 0.02$ . More important, this was due to significant main effects of identification,  $\beta = -.97$ ,  $t = 2.32$ ,  $p = 0.02$ , and candidate's opinions,  $\beta = -.96$ ,  $t = -2.17$ ,  $p = 0.03$ , at Step 1,  $R^2_{\text{ch}(3, 74)} = 0.15$ ,  $F_{\text{ch}} = 4.33$ ,  $p = 0.007$ , and a marginally significant three-way interaction at Step 3,  $R^2_{\text{ch}} = 0.04$ ,  $F_{\text{ch}(1, 70)} = 3.60$ ,  $p = 0.06$ .




Figure 3. Study 2: The interaction among identification, candidate's opinions and opinion context on candidate support

normative ( $M = 5.31$ ) and deviant ( $M = 5.26$ ) candidates were seen to be motivated to attract votes,  $F_{(1, 68)} = 0.02, p = 0.90, \eta^2 = 0.00$ . Examination of the candidate's perceived chances of winning revealed a significant Candidate Opinions  $\times$  Opinion Context interaction,  $F_{(1, 68)} = 6.40, p = 0.01, \eta^2 = 0.09$ . The normative candidate ( $M = 5.01$ ) was seen to have better chances of winning than the deviant ( $M = 3.88$ ) only when public opinion was supportive of the ingroup position,  $F_{(1, 68)} = 6.25, p = 0.02$ . When public opinion was hostile, respondents did not distinguish between normative ( $M = 4.14$ ) and deviant ( $M = 4.48$ ) candidates in terms of their chances of winning,  $F_{(1, 68)} = 0.86, p = 0.36$ .

### Mediation Analysis

The above analyses suggest that both lower and higher identifiers recognised the differential advantage of normative and deviant candidates dependent on the context of public opinion. This precludes the possibility that candidate support was mediated through a strategic judgment (i.e. the candidate's perceived chances of success) at least across the full sample. However, given the parallel Candidate Opinion  $\times$  Opinion Context interactions on candidate support and perceived chances of success among higher identifiers, mediation within this group was a possibility, parallel to the pattern observed in Study 1. Consistent with this, when perceived chances of success was entered as a covariate of higher identifiers candidate support, there was a significant effect for the covariate,  $F_{(1, 67)} = 5.76, p = 0.02$ , and the previously significant Candidate Opinion  $\times$  Opinion Context interaction became non-

significant,  $F_{(1, 67)} = 0.80$ ,  $p = 0.37$ . Although this suggests mediation, a Sobel test on the change in significance was not reliable,  $z = -1.15$ ,  $p = 0.25$ .<sup>4</sup>

## Discussion

This study investigated the role of strategic concerns in responses to deviant and normative representatives of the ingroup. Consistent with research into the black sheep effect (e.g. Marques et al., 1988, 1998a), a candidate who remained true to their party's norm generally received stronger support than a candidate who questioned the group's norm and expressed opinions more consistent with the political opposition. However, this main effect was qualified by the context of opinion expression and the respondent's strength of identification with their political party.

Consistent with the pattern observed in Study 1, highly identified partisans gave more support to a normative candidate relative to a deviant only when public opinion supported the ingroup norm. When public opinion was against the group's norm, higher identifiers gave equal support to the normative candidate and the deviant, who moved away from the group norm and closer to public opinion. Among lower identifiers, responses to normative and deviant group members were not affected by the broader context of public opinion. Furthermore, the pattern of support among higher identifiers was related to a judgment about the candidate's likely chances of success. However, in this study, attempts to show mediation were not successful. Despite this, it is clear that highly identified partisans did not reject a deviant political candidate when faced with the threat of a voting public hostile to the normative ingroup position (c.f. Branscombe et al., 1993; Marques et al., 2001), and that this may have been related to a strategic judgments on the part of the respondent.

Analysis of the perceived motives of the candidate themselves revealed that deviants were seen to be more motivated to express their own opinion, and less motivated to express the opinions of their political ingroup, relative to the normative candidate. Effectively, deviants may have been seen to be acting as individuals rather than good group members. Both normative and deviant candidates were perceived to be equally motivated to attract votes—perhaps reflecting the fact that they were, after all, politicians. Interestingly, the motivations attributed to the candidate (strategic or otherwise) did not seem to play a role in guiding responses to them. As such, in this study it seems that strategy was in the eye of the perceiver rather than the actor. Highly identified group members gave their support to candidates who were also perceived to have the best chances of winning, irrespective of the perceived motives of the actual candidate (c.f. McGraw et al., 2002).

## GENERAL DISCUSSION

Two studies provide evidence that responses to normative and deviant group members might be guided by strategic motives to achieve group-based success, at least under certain conditions. In Study 1, highly identified Conservative Party supporters gave more support to a potential leader who advocated preserving ingroup norms, rather than abandoning these to pursue radical change, when public support for the party was perceived to be increasing. When public support for the party was perceived to be

<sup>4</sup>Within the lower identifier group, the covariate was also significant,  $F_{(1, 67)} = 11.00$ ,  $p = 0.001$ . However with the covariate entered, the previously non-significant Candidate Opinion  $\times$  Opinion Context interaction became significant,  $F_{(1, 67)} = 7.25$ ,  $p = 0.009$ . A Sobel test on this change in significance was marginally reliable,  $1.77$ ,  $p = 0.07$ , suggesting a pattern of suppression. That is, lower identifiers may have given their support to candidates *in spite of* their chances of success. At the very least, consistent with Study 1, there was no evidence of a similar pattern of mediation in this group as for higher identifiers.

decreasing, this pattern of support was reversed and the deviant leader received more support than the traditionalist leader. Similarly, in Study 2 highly identified partisans from both sides of the political spectrum gave greater support to a normative candidate when the public was perceived to be sympathetic to the ingroup norm. When the public was perceived to be hostile to the ingroup norm, both normative and deviant candidates were evaluated equally. Thus, across the studies, high identifiers appeared to promote normative candidates and to tolerate (Study 2), if not actively support (Study 1), deviants precisely under the conditions in which each of these candidates would be likely to succeed given the mood of the voting public. Consistent with our interpretation of this as a strategic process, support given to candidates by high identifiers were found to be related to judgments about their chances of achieving success. As such, this group appeared to respond to the meaning of deviance for the group (i.e. seeing deviance in the context of a group-level strategy: Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; Ellemers et al., 1997) rather than focussing specifically on the extent, or direction, of norm violation (c.f. Abrams et al., 2000; Marques et al., 1998a).

Although the pattern observed for high identifiers was broadly consistent across studies, the pattern among low identifiers appeared less systematic. Although low identifiers' responses to normative and deviant candidates were not significantly moderated by opinion context, it is interesting that the patterns apparent within this group were in opposition in each of the studies. That is, in Study 1, low identifiers seemed most positive toward a deviant when the public was sympathetic of their party's traditional beliefs, whereas in Study 2 this group were most positive toward the normative candidate when the public was perceived to be hostile to the ingroup norm. It is unclear precisely why these opposing patterns were observed, or indeed whether they are meaningful in the absence of statistical effects. Future research may find it useful to explore more carefully how low identifiers respond to potentially strategic behaviour by others within their group.

The patterns observed in both studies provide support for our theoretical argument. However, it is also possible that these were partially attributable to majority-minority dynamics. Manipulations of opinion context may have also influenced the perceived majority or minority status of the ingroup. As such, when placed in a minority position, group members may have been more tolerant of deviants because they defended the majority position. Although this cannot be ruled out, in many respects it is not inconsistent with the present argument. Within a struggle for power, groups are likely to appeal to the perceived values of their audience, not just because they are the majority, but also because it is strategic to do so.

The role of strategic considerations may also have been amplified in the present research given the political context (see Tetlock, 2002). Indeed, research suggests that voters are particularly sensitive to, and suspicious of, strategic behaviour by politicians. Furthermore, the link between strategic behaviour and suspicion is likely to be attenuated among people who agree with the politician's expressed opinions (McGraw et al., 2002). Consistent with the present research, this suggests that strategic behaviour (in terms of matching one's opinion to the likely opinion of an audience) might not trigger the same levels of negativity when performed by someone who is 'on our side' politically. In comparison, people might be quick to label behaviour 'strategic' when performed by representatives of the outgroup, and respond with suspicion accordingly. High identifiers may be particularly willing to play along with this political game. Future research might find it useful to explore the links among identity, strategic concerns and evaluations of deviance between groups, not just within them, as in the present study.

Stepping back from the specific issues raised by each of the studies, it is interesting to reflect on what the current research might mean for issues of stability and change within groups more generally. Much research in social psychology, and in the social identity tradition in particular, seems to emphasise the importance of stability within groups. For instance, in addition to rejecting others who deviate from the group norms, individuals may themselves abandon a group when it veers in a direction that is perceived

to break historical continuity (e.g. Sani, 2005). Similarly, individuals who most clearly resemble the current prototype of the group should be attributed with more charisma, be more popular among other group members, and be selectively promoted to positions of leadership (e.g. Hogg, 2001).

In contrast to these perspectives, the current research suggests that group members are attuned to more than simple questions of prototypicality or collective continuity when evaluating their groups and those contained within them. Instead, highly identified group members seem to be aware of multiple contingencies when thinking about the appropriate direction in which to steer their group, including the group's current realities and future possibilities afforded by a situation (see also Hornsey, 2006). These factors may not always rest in harmony with each other, and as such decisions about when to change, and in what direction, are unlikely to be easy ones. But equally they are questions that are unlikely to be simply ignored. To account for this picture, a more complex social psychological analysis of these questions of transformation and change, not just resistance, appears to be wanting.

## Conclusions

Two studies suggest that concerns for cohesion around valued norms might not be the only criteria by which the behaviour of group members is judged. Strategic considerations might also come into play. Although the patterns observed stand in contrast to much previous research on deviance, they square well with research that has emphasised how reality constraints can limit identity expression and enactment (Reicher et al., 1995, 1998; Reicher & Levine, 1994a, 1994b, see Reicher, 2000 for a discussion). Research informed by the latter perspective has emphasised the strategic expression of norms by low identifiers (e.g. Barreto & Ellemers, 2000, 2002; Ellemers, van Dyck, Hinkle, & Jacobs, 2000; Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003). Our research suggests that high identifiers can be equally strategic. Although deviance is typically rejected, especially by those highly identified with a group, it might also be tolerated—at least when deviance can further the interests of the group as a whole. Returning to the example with which this paper began, support for Pat Richardson's candidacy among some members of her party appears to have been well placed. Along with two of her colleagues, she was elected to a seat in which the BNP previously had no representation.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Thanks to Fabrizio Butera, Paul Hutchinson and two anonymous reviewers for valuable feedback on earlier drafts, and to Leda Blackwood, Daisy Brooke, Frank Mols and Sally Lai for help with data collection. Part of this research was conducted while the first author was employed by the University of Queensland, Australia. This research was partially supported by an ESRC research fellowship (RES 000-27-0050) to Tom Postmes.

## REFERENCES

- Abrams, D., Marques, J. M., Bown, N., & Henson, M. (2000). Pro-norm and anti-norm deviance within and between groups. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 78, 906–912.

- Abrams, D., Randsley de Moura, G., Hutchison, P., & Viki, G. T. (2005). When bad becomes good (and vice versa): Why social exclusion is not based on difference. In D. Abrams, M. Hogg, & J. Marques (Eds.), *The social psychology of inclusion and exclusion* (pp. 161–189). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
- Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2000). You can't always do what you want: Social identity and self-presentational determinants of choice to work for a low-status group. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*, 891–906.
- Barreto, M., & Ellemers, N. (2002). The impact of anonymity and group identification on pro-group behaviour in computer mediated groups: Small Group Research. *Special European Views of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *33*, 590–610.
- Branscombe, N., Wann, D., Noel, J., & Coleman, J. (1993). In-group or out-group extremity: Importance of threatened social identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *19*, 381–388.
- Castano, E., Paladino, M., Coull, A., & Yzerbyt, V. (2002). Protecting the ingroup stereotype: Ingroup identification and the management of deviant ingroup members. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *41*, 365–385.
- Doosje, B., & Ellemers, N. (1997). Stereotyping under threat: The role of group identification. In R. Spears, P. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & S.A. Haslam (Eds.), *The social psychology of stereotyping and group life* (pp. 257–272), Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1997). Sticking together or falling apart: In-group identification as a psychological determinant of group commitment versus individual mobility. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *72*, 617–626.
- Ellemers, N., van Dyck, C., Hinkle, S., & Jacobs, A. (2000). Intergroup differentiation in social context: Identity needs versus audience constraints. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *63*, 60–74.
- Golan, O. (5th June 2004). Interview: Pat Richardson. *The times magazine* (pp. 45–46), London: Times Newspaper Limited.
- Hogg, M. (2001). A social identity theory of leadership. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *5*, 184–200.
- Hollander, E. P. (1958). Conformity, status, and idiosyncrasy credit. *Psychological Review*, *65*, 117–127.
- Hornsey, M. J. (2006). Individuals influencing groups: The case of the ingroup critic. In T. Postmes & J. Jetten (Eds.), *Individuality in the group: Advances in social Identity*. London: Sage.
- Hornsey, M. J., Jetten, J., McAuliffe, B. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2006). The impact of individualist and collectivist group norms on evaluations of dissenting group members. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *42*, 57–68.
- Hutchinson, P., & Abrams, D. (2003). Ingroup identification moderates stereotypes change in reaction to ingroup deviance. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 497–506.
- Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Spears, R., & McKimmie, B. M. (2003). Predicting the paths of peripherals: The interaction of identification and future possibilities. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*, 130–140.
- Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., Paez, D., & Martinez-Toboada, C. (1998a). The role of categorisation and in-group norms in judgments of groups and their members. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*, 976–988.
- Marques, J. M., Abrams, D., & Serôdio, R. G. (2001). Being better by being right: Subjective group dynamics and derogation of ingroup deviants when generic norms are undermined. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*, 436–477.
- Marques, J. M., Paez, D., & Abrams, D. (1998b). Social identity and intragroup differentiation as subjective social control. In S. Worchel, J. Morales, D. Paez, & J.-C. Deschamps (Eds.), *Social identity: International perspectives* (pp. 124–141). New York: Sage.
- Marques, J. M., Yzerbyt, V., & Leyens, J.-P. (1988). Extremity of judgments toward ingroup members as a function of ingroup identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 1–16.
- Matheson, K., Cole, B., & Majaka, K. (2002). Dissidence from within: Examining the effects of intergroup context on group members' reaction to attitudinal opposition. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *39*, 161–169.
- McGraw, K., Lodge, M., & Jones, J. (2002). The pandering politicians of suspicious minds. *The Journal of Politics*, *64*, 362–383.
- Moscovici, S. (1980). Toward a theory of conversion behaviour. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, *13*, 209–239.
- Reicher, S. (2000). Social identity definition and enactment: A broad SIDE against irrationalism and relativism. In T. Postmes, R. Spears, M. Lea, & S. Reicher (Eds.), *SIDE issues centre stage: Recent developments in studies of de-individuation in groups* (pp. 175–190). Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.
- Reicher, S., & Levine, M. (1994a). Deindividuation, power relations between groups and the expression of social identity: The effect of visibility to the out-group. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *33*, 145–163.

- Reicher, S. & Levine, M. (1994b). On the consequences of deindividuation manipulations for the strategic communication of the self: Identifiability and the presentation of social identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 24, 511–524.
- Reicher, S., Levine, M., & Gordijn, E. (1998). More on deindividuation, power relations between groups and the expression of social identity: Three studies on the effects of visibility to the in-group. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 37, 15–40.
- Reicher, S., Spears, R., & Postmes, T. (1995). A social identity model of deindividuation phenomena. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European Review of Social Psychology*, 6, 161–198.
- Sani, F. (2005). When subgroups secede: Extending and refining the social psychological model of schisms in groups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31, 1074–1086.
- Scheepers, D., Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Manstead, A. (2003). Integrating identity and instrumental approaches to intergroup differentiation: Different contexts, different motives. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28, 1455–1467.
- Spears, R., Lea, M., Corneliussen, R. A., Postmes, T., & Ter Haar, W. (2002). Computer-mediated communication as a channel for social resistance—The strategic side of SIDE. *Small Group Research*, 33, 555–574.
- Tabachnick, B. & Fidell, L. (1996). *Using multivariate statistics*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1–39.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tetlock, P. E. (2002). Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors. *Psychological Review*, 109, 451–471.

Copyright of European Journal of Social Psychology is the property of John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 1996 and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.